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The parliamentary elections to be held in Ukraine on 26 October will bring about deep chan-
ges in the political composition of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. It is very pro-
bable that after the elections only one or two of the five parties which are represented in the 
parliament today will remain, and the leading positions will be taken by groupings who were 
still considered marginal a year ago. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, a party which according to 
polls can count on victory, did not exist a year ago and today still remains in the construction 
phase. It is likely that around two-thirds of the newly elected deputies will be people with no 
parliamentary or even no political experience. On the one hand, this may be a strong impetus 
to revival; but on the other the lack of experience of most of the parliamentarians may be 
a problem. Another source of potential problems may be the process of consolidating the 
internally unstable political parties which have emerged during the electoral campaign. 
All of the parties which will count in the upcoming elections have a pro-European programme. It 
is probable that the numerous supporters of an anti-Western orientation (although not necessa-
rily a pro-Russian orientation, as recent events have shown) will be represented by very few de-
puties elected in single-mandate constituencies. On the one hand, this homogeneity within the 
Rada will facilitate the country’s reforms, including work on the new constitution, while on the 
other it might be a subject of permanent criticism by Moscow and its Ukrainian representatives.
The elections will take place in the conditions of a growing wave of social disappointment and 
ongoing military actions in the eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, it can be expected that 
the vote will be held without any major disturbances, and its course will be transparent and fair. 
Preparations for the elections
The elections will be held according to the 
mixed ordination which has been in force since 
2011: half the deputies will be chosen propor-
tionally to the national lists, and the other half 
in single-member constituencies (this ballot is 
determined by relative majority). More than 50 
political parties will run in the elections, out of 
which 29 will contest mandates in a national 
constituency (in proportional ballot); the rest 
have candidates nominated in single-member 
constituencies only. Only 12 parties have nomi-
nated more than 100 candidates in the national 
constituency, and 7 in single-member constitu-
encies. In total, 6627 candidates have been reg-
istered, including 3120 on party lists (detailed 
information is contained in Appendix 1, and 
basic information on the major parties in Ap-
pendix 2).
The Central Electoral Committee has registered 
candidates in all constituencies in the Lugansk 
and Donetsk oblasts, irrespective of the fact 
that the elections will certainly not be held in 
14 of them, nor very probably in another six. 
The authorities have introduced special facilita-
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tive measures for residents of these constituen-
cies (and also Crimea) who are away from their 
permanent place of residence and wish to add 
their names to the electoral lists.
The electoral campaign
Unlike in previous elections, this year’s contest 
involves two main groups: the “patriotic-revolu-
tionary” one, whose major feature is its support 
for President Poroshenko and the country’s terri-
torial integrity, and the “old regime-pro-Russian” 
one, whose main feature is its strong opposi-
tion towards the revolutionary change in power 
which took place in February 2014. These are iso-
lated groups of voters, and the parties appealing 
to either of them do not intend to extend their 
influence any further than the limits of the given 
group. This division is the result of the ‘Revolu-
tion of Dignity’ (as the social protests organised 
between November 2013 and February 2014 are 
called in Ukraine) and the subsequent war. These 
two factors have contributed not only to this 
degree of polarisation, but also to an increase 
in the number of people identifying themselves 
with the first group and a weakening of the sec-
ond group of voters. 
Most of the parties which count in the upcom-
ing elections draw on patriotic and revolution-
ary slogans (i.e. mainly those calling for lustra-
tion and anti-corruption measures). The rivalry 
is between the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the 
People’s Front on one side, and Batkivshchyna 
and the Radical Party on the other. Also im-
portant is the rivalry between Batkivshchyna 
and the Radical Party. The Petro Poroshenko 
Bloc and the People’s Front have not criticised 
one another, and have announced the signing 
of a coalition agreement even before the elec-
tions. Apparently, the stricter and more outspo-
ken attitude of the People’s Front’s politicians 
over the Donbas issue could be an element of 
common tactics agreed with the Poroshenko 
Bloc. The People’s Front and Batkivshchyna are 
fighting not only over the electorate, but also 
over party structures, while the Radical Party 
seems to be appealing to the poorly educated 
residents of villages and small towns, who are 
a part of Batkivshchyna’s traditional electorate. 
The main element of the campaign organised by 
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc has been the actions 
of President Poroshenko himself, including his 
support in parliament for the lustration act and 
a package of anti-corruption laws (finally enacted 
on 14 October). At the same time Poroshenko’s 
patriotic rhetoric is supposed to hide the fact that 
Ukraine has lost the war (although the fighting 
continues, even if on a limited scale), and has to 
adjust its policy to this circumstance. The volun-
tary battalions which are fighting in Donbas have 
become an important element of the domestic 
policy, and their retreat for rest and recuperation 
in October has increased the influence of their 
members on voters in many regions. 
In some single-mandate constituencies, the 
‘patriotic camp’ forces have jointly agreed on 
a group of candidates, so that no representa-
tives of the ‘old regime’ will have a chance to 
win the elections. The Poroshenko Bloc has not 
put forward candidates in some constituen-
cies, thereby assuring several members of the 
Svoboda party and the long-term chairman of 
the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn of man-
dates. In the final weeks before the elections, 
the Poroshenko Bloc, the People’s Front and 
even Batkivshchyna have withdrawn their can-
didates in some oblasts, so that there remains 
only one candidate of the broadly understood 
‘patriotic camp’ to compete with candidates 
from the former Party of Regions. 
The electoral campaign has been progressing 
with no major procedural violations, the excep-
tion being the reports from some of the ma-
jority constituencies suggesting attempts at 
Unlike in previous elections, this year’s 
contest involves two main groups: the 
“patriotic-revolutionary” and the “old 
regime–pro-Russian”.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 149
bribing the voters by several candidates associ-
ated with the previous regime. It seems that the 
number of paid press materials and the scale of 
black PR has been less significant than in the 
previous campaigns. 
Recent weeks have seen a renewed increase in 
social tensions in Ukraine, resulting to a large 
extent from the dissatisfaction with the speed 
of the ongoing reforms, especially in the area 
of combating corruption. These reforms were 
among the demands voiced during the winter 
protests. Recently there have been cases of the 
monuments to Lenin being pulled down again, 
corrupt officials being illegally dismissed from 
their posts etc. The first symptoms of a loss of 
patience within the army have appeared, and 
tension between the voluntary formations and 
the armed forces led Poroshenko to change the 
minister of defence. Several demonstrations in 
front of the parliament building have been or-
ganised with the aim of forcing the passing of 
certain laws much awaited by society; during 
the recent demonstration on 14 October, 
a provocation with the use of firearms was or-
ganised. 
In this situation, attempts at violating the elec-
tion procedures in some locations cannot be 
excluded, especially in the Kyiv-controlled parts 
of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. Otherwise, 
a peaceful course of the ballot and a fair and 
transparent process of determining its results 
can be expected. The elections will be super-
vised by 510 international observers, 750 rep-
resentatives of Ukrainian non-governmental or-
ganizations and around 600 representatives of 
the candidates and the political parties.
The election lists
The new parliament will be thoroughly renewed 
and rejuvenated. Of the five parties current-
ly represented in the parliament only three are 
running in the elections, and out of these three 
only Batkivshchyna can be sure of crossing the 
5% electoral threshold. To a great extent the lists 
of all the parties which have a chance of being 
elected to the parliament contain the names of 
individuals who have not hitherto been involved 
in politics. They include activists of the ‘Revolu-
tion of Dignity’ (from Kyiv and other oblasts), 
voluntary officers, journalists (including a group 
of top investigative journalists headed by Serhiy 
Leshchenko and Mustafa Nayem), social activ-
ists, etc. There are also many new faces from 
among representatives of the business circles. 
A sharp sectoral shift has been observed: there 
are fewer representatives of heavy industry and 
the mining industry, and more candidates from 
the agricultural sector and the food industry; 
they will form a strong lobby in the new parlia-
ment for the first time since the 1990s. 
The oligarchs’ representation will be signifi-
cantly reduced, especially in the case of tycoons 
associated with former President Yanukovych. 
The so-called ‘Family’ headed by Yanukovych’s 
son has disappeared from the political stage, 
and the few candidates associated with Rinat 
Akhmetov have almost exclusively joined the 
lists of the Opposition Bloc and Strong Ukraine. 
There are slightly more representatives of the 
Firtash-Lovochkin group (associated with the 
chemical industry); most of them have joined 
the Poroshenko Bloc lists (as candidates asso-
ciated with the UDAR party), and some are on 
the Radical Party’s lists. It is not always clear 
whether the politicians and economic activists 
who were still associated with oligarchs last 
year have now changed their sponsors. There is 
a large group of candidates associated with Ihor 
Kolomoyski; they have been given top positions 
on the lists of both the Poroshenko Bloc and 
the People’s Front, as well as Strong Ukraine. 
Kolomoyski has tacitly supported other politi-
Recent weeks have seen a renewed in-
crease in social tensions in Ukraine, result-
ing to a large extent from the dissatisfaction 
with the speed of the ongoing reforms, es-
pecially in the area of combating corruption.
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cal forces as well (Svoboda in particular) and 
openly criticized Oleh Lashko’s Radical Party. 
The composition of the electoral lists reflects 
the changes which have taken place in Ukraine 
over the last year. The group associated with 
Yanukovych has been eliminated from political 
and economic life; the Akhmetov group has al-
most disintegrated (mainly as a result of mis-
takes made during the initial phase of the Don-
bas conflict); and the Firtash group has been 
significantly weakened by internal conflicts and 
the money-laundering charges brought against 
Firtash in the USA (Firtash himself has been un-
der house arrest in Vienna for several months 
now). Kolomoyski, on the other hand, has not 
hesitated to support the new authorities and 
expressed his active support as governor of the 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Today he is the ‘number 
one’ among Ukrainian oligarchs, and plans to 
assure himself of significant political represen-
tation. 
According to initial assessments, at least two-
thirds of the deputies in the new parliamenta-
ry term may be people with no experience in 
parliamentary work. This may hamper the leg-
islative process exactly at the time when the 
Verkhovna Rada needs to efficiently pass the 
necessary laws to enable deep political and eco-
nomic reforms in Ukraine. A more or less formal 
lobby of Donbas war veterans who might have 
significant political ambitions will be formed 
in the parliament. It is already evident that the 
clubs of the major political parties (especially 
the Poroshenko Bloc, a party which began to 
organise in August) and the Radical Party will 
be internally incoherent and threatened by di-
visions. 
The pre-election forecast
The available polls suggest that the unques-
tioned leader is the Poroshenko Bloc, which can 
count on over 30% of the votes. Support for this 
party, or rather the candidates of President Po-
roshenko, has been growing in recent weeks. It 
seems probable that the Bloc will have an ab-
solute majority in the Verkhovna Rada along 
with the candidates elected in the majority con-
stituencies. If not, it will try to form a coalition 
with the People’s Front; if this is the case Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk will remain in office as Prime Minister. 
Ranked second in the polls is Oleh Lashko’s 
Radical Party, which was supported by 20% 
of the respondents in early September but has 
now lost almost half of this support. This rapid 
fall in the support figures, which has not been 
motivated by any major scandal or other type 
of embarrassment caused by the party leader, 
may bring the credibility of the published fig-
ures into question. 
The next positions are occupied by Batkivshchy-
na, the Civic Position and the People’s Front, 
which all have support figures well above the 
5% electoral threshold. Support for Svoboda, 
Strong Ukraine, and according to some polls 
also the Opposition Bloc, is around 5%. The re-
maining parties have no chance of being elected 
in the proportional ballot, although representa-
tives of some of them may be elected to the 
parliament in single-member constituencies. 
However, it should be added that the differenc-
es between the polls published by prestigious 
public opinion research companies are greater 
than during the previous election campaigns.
It is likely that the “old regime-pro-Russian” 
electorate will have a very weak representa-
tion in the new Verkhovna Rada, or possibly 
no representation at all. On the one hand this 
will hamper the achievement of a lasting solu-
tion of the Donbas conflict, and on the other, it 
will give Moscow a pretext to criticise the new 
composition of the Ukrainian parliament as one 
with no proper representation.
The available polls suggest that the un-
questioned leader is the Poroshenko Bloc, 
which can count on over 30% of the votes.
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APPENDIX 1
Political parties which have nominated at least 10 candidates in the national constituency 
(proportional ballot) or at least 50 members of regional electoral committees 
(according to the number of candidates, as of 7 October 2014)
Apart from the candidates, the Central Electoral Committee has registered party representatives in 
the electoral committees in 213 constituencies (the total number of constituencies is 225, although 
the elections will not be held in 12 constituencies in Crimea). In total, 3507 such representatives have 
been registered. They can be nominated in two possible procedures: by the parties which nominate 
candidates, and by the parties which are represented in the parliament no matter if they run in the 
elections. This is how the representatives of the Party of Regions and UDAR made their way onto 
the lists, and how Svoboda and Batkivshchyna achieved double representation. Some minor parties 
which have submitted just a few candidates (or no candidate at all, as in the case of the Ukrainian 
Pensioners’ Party) have at the same time nominated large groups of committee members; this trick 
is supposed to assure the major parties of increased representation in the committees, and in this 
way influence the committees’ work.
Political party
candidates committee  
representativesproportional majority
People’s Front 221 138 0
Oleh Lashko’s Radical Party 220 177 150
Batkivshchyna 213 179 145 + 213
Svoboda 206 26 154 + 212
Communist Party of Ukraine 205 105 146
Strong Ukraine 201 126 0
Opposition Bloc 194 114 0
Petro Poroshenko Bloc 193 151 0
Agrarian Federation Zastup 183 37 0
‘5.10’ Party 173 3 0
Civic Position 146 10 0
Left-wing Forces Bloc 109 42 0
Green Planet 98 18 141
Ukrayina – Yedina Krayina 92 0 0
Rebirth 89 0 0
Liberal Party of Ukraine 81 39 157
Power and Honour (Sich) 72 0 0
Solidarity of Ukrainian Women 61 7 0
Self-Support Party 60 12 0
Green Party of Ukraine 52 2 141
Ukraine of the Future 51 0 152
People’s Power Party 37 16 0
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Political party
candidates committee  
representativesproportional majority
New Politics 36 7 158
Civic Movement of Ukraine 34 0 0
Right Sector 31 35 59
Yedina Krayina 27 0 0
Internet Party of Ukraine 17 6 0
National-Democratic Party of Ukraine 14 10 0
Ukrainian Platform Sobor 0 6 145
The Greens 0 2 149
Ukrainian Pensioners’ Party 0 0 109
Parties which are not running in the elections
UDAR 210
Party of Regions 213
APPENDIX 2
Major parties running in the elections 
(in alphabetical order)
The names of the top five candidates of the individual parties are printed on the ballot paper and 
are considered each party’s symbols, and so their selection is one of the most important elements 
of electoral canvassing. 
Batkivshchyna
The party’s top five candidates are: Nadia Savchenko (Ukrainian military aviation officer, captured 
by separatists and turned over to Russia, where she is still imprisoned), Yulia Tymoshenko (party 
leader), Ihor Lutsenko (journalists and social activist, one of the leaders of the Maidan, Kyiv city 
councillor; unrelated to Yuriy Lutsenko), Serhiy Sobolev (deputy leader of the party and head of its 
parliamentary faction) and Alona Shkrum (lawyer and social activist, graduate of the University of 
Cambridge and the Université Panthéon Sorbonne). 
Until the recent split, Batkivshchyna had been one of Ukraine’s largest political parties with over half 
a million members and well-developed structures across the country. The number of party members 
who left the party with the Yatsenyuk and Turchynov group is unclear. The party’s main asset is the 
popularity of Yulia Tymoshenko among part of society. 
The Civic Position 
The party’s top five candidates are: Anatoliy Hrytsenko (former minister of defence), Vasyl Hat’ko 
(Kyiv city councillor), Maryna Solovyova (Hrytsenko’s adviser, lawyer), Oleh Derevyanko (business-
man and social activist) and Vitaliy Shabunin (social activist). 
The party has very limited organisational and human potential; its asset is Hrytsenko’s popularity as 
one of the major supporters of the idea of reconstructing the army and suppressing the rebellion in 
Donetsk by force. 
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The Communist Party of Ukraine 
The party’s top five candidates are: Petro Symonenko (the party’s leader since 1991), Adam Mar-
tynyuk (long-term deputy chairman of the Verkhovna Rada), Kateryna Samoylik (teacher, parlia-
mentarian since 1994), Vasyl Sirenko (lawyer, university lecturer, former parliamentarian, aged 73) 
and Petro Tsybenko (a former functionary in the structures of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, parliamentarian since 1994). 
Public support for the CPU has been systematically decreasing, and the annexation of Crimea has 
deprived it of a large part of both its members and voters. The party has proved unable to inject 
new blood into its ranks (all of the top five candidates are aged over 60), and its leaders have openly 
supported the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas rebellion. In July 2014 a procedure was initiated 
to remove the CPU from the register of political parties.
The Oleh Lashko Radical Party 
The party’s top five candidates are: Oleh Lashko, Andriy Lozovy (the party’s vice-leader, Kyiv city 
councillor), Serhiy Melnychuk (former professional soldier, commander of the Aydar voluntary bat-
talion), Inna Bordyuh (popular singer known as Zlata Oknevych) and Yuriy-Bohdan Shukhevych 
(aged 81, son of the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a symbolic figure rather than 
a political activist). 
The Radical Party is a formation centred on its leader, with no clear structure. It is popular especially 
in the centre and the south of the country. The party’s asset is its extremely radical rhetoric targeted 
at less educated voters. Its position as number one on the ballot paper, allocated to this party as 
a result of a draw, is another asset.
The Opposition Bloc 
The party’s top five candidates are: Yuriy Boyko (former deputy prime minister, previously minister 
of energy, associated with the Lovochkin–Firtash group), Oleksandr Vilkul (former deputy prime 
minister, associated with the Akhmetov group), Mykhaylo Dobkin (former head of administration 
of the Kharkiv oblast), Vadym Rabinovych (oligarch and Jewish community activist, one of the 
Bloc’s few candidates not associated with the Party of Regions) and Oleksiy Bilyi (former director of 
the Azovstal enterprise in Mariupol). The other positions on the lists are occupied mainly by activists 
of the Party of Regions (except for those directly associated with Viktor Yanukovych). 
The People’s Front 
The party’s top five candidates are: Arseniy Yatsenyuk (prime minister), Tetyana Chornovol (well-
known investigative journalist, appointed head of the anti-corruption office in February 2014), Olek-
sandr Turchynov (chairman of the Verkhovna Rada), Andriy Parubiy (secretary of the National 
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine between February and August 2014, previously a comman-
dant of the Maidan Self-Defence) and Andriy Teteruk (former professional soldier, commander of 
the Peacekeeper [Myrotvorets] voluntary battalion). 
The People’s Front is being formed during the election campaign, mainly by taking over the struc-
tures and the activists of Batkivshchyna, in particular the former members of the Front for Changes 
(a party led by Yatsenyuk, dissolved in 2013). In the election campaign the party has operated mainly 
on the recognisability and authority of Yatsenyuk and Turchynov.
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The Petro Poroshenko Bloc
The party’s top five candidates are Vitaliy Klichko (leader of the UDAR party, mayor of Kyiv, has 
openly stated that he will not be a member of the parliament), Yuri Lutsenko (the party’s leader, 
one of the organisers of the Maidan), Olha Bohomolets (well-known doctor and social activist, who 
organised the Maidan’s medical service), Volodymyr Hroysman (first deputy prime minister, former 
mayor of Vinnitsa, a potential prime minister in the new government) and Mustafa Jemilev (the 
unquestioned leader of the Crimean Tatars, long-term head of the Mejlis). 
Solidarity, a party re-created in 2014 and renamed the Petro Poroshenko Bloc during the election 
campaign, has never been an important grouping; in the election campaign it has based its ac-
tions on the organisational structures and the active supporters of UDAR. The Bloc’s main asset is 
the popularity of Petro Poroshenko, and its main post-election challenge is to transform itself into 
a regular political party. 
Strong Ukraine 
The party’s top five candidates are: Serhiy Tihipko, Valeriy Khoroshkovski (former state official 
as head of Ukraine’s Security Service, businessman, associated with the Lovochkin group), Svitlana 
Fabrykant (journalist and parliamentarian), Andriy Hamov (vice-governor of the Zaporozhe oblast) 
and Ihor Mazepa (manager in the banking sector with no political experience). 
The party is being formed during the election campaign mainly by taking over the structures and the 
activists of the Party of Regions, and enjoys the support of some of the oligarchic business circles; 
however its programme is too vague to attract voters dissatisfied with the current authorities’ geo-
political orientation and ongoing political actions 
Svoboda
The party’s top five candidates are: Oleh Tyahnybok (the party’s leader), Ruslan Koshulinski (dep-
uty chairman of the Verkhovna Rada), Oleksandr Sych (deputy leader of the party for ideologi-
cal affairs), Bohdan Benyuk (deputy leader of the party, well-known theatre actor) and Oleksiy 
Myrhorodski (a Kharkiv businessman, currently in active military service). 
In the 2010 elections Svoboda gained 10.4% of the votes, although its support figures have recently 
fallen due to both the party’s inconsistent attitude during the Maidan, and the negative assessment 
of its members’ work in western Ukraine’s local government structures. 
